People Who Are Not Legal and Who Are Not Alive in the Eyes of the Law by Painter, Richard W.
Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 4 
9-1-2014 
People Who Are Not Legal and Who Are Not Alive in the Eyes of 
the Law 
Richard W. Painter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard W. Painter, People Who Are Not Legal and Who Are Not Alive in the Eyes of the Law, 59 Vill. L. 
Rev. 667 (2014). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss4/4 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-4\VLR404.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-SEP-14 14:16
2014]
PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT LEGAL AND WHO ARE NOT ALIVE
IN THE EYES OF THE LAW
RICHARD W. PAINTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Persons and Masks of the Law,1 John T. Noonan, Jr. juxtaposes legalrules based upon abstract principles with the persons whose lives are
affected by these legal rules.  Judges and legal commentators articulate
and expound upon legal rules and abstract principles, but often ignore
the persons who are the subjects of the law. Persons and Masks of the Law
addresses this imbalance by introducing the reader to the people in fa-
mous and not so famous cases, ranging from the coincidental plaintiff,
Mrs. Palsgraf in 1928,2 to the slaves subjected to Virginia’s colonial laws.3
This Essay explores the interaction of persons with the law in two con-
texts.  The first is a person who is considered to be “illegal” in a particular
jurisdiction because he or she is not legally present in the jurisdiction.
The second is a factual dispute about whether or not a person is “alive,” an
issue that arises when judges try to define the boundaries of human life,
both the very beginning of human life and the very end.  This Essay raises
questions about personhood and the law in these two contexts.  This Es-
say’s normative conclusions, however, are limited.  Meaningful conclu-
sions about what courts and lawmakers should do with respect to persons
who are present in the jurisdiction but are not legally here, or about per-
sons who may or may not yet/still be alive, requires more thoughtful con-
sideration than space or time allows here.  The question raised here is
whether abstract “masks of the law” imposed by legislatures and/or by
courts avoid difficult questions about persons and their legal rights and
instead take the path of justice down a short cut that treats some people as
if they do not exist.
II. WHEN COURTS RULE THAT PERSONS ARE NOT “LEGAL”
Sometimes the law acknowledges that a person exists, but labels that
person “illegal” because he or she is not lawfully present in the jurisdic-
tion.  “Illegal immigrant” and “illegal alien” are common terms for such a
person, although sometimes the person is simply said to be an “illegal.”
* S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of Minnesota;
Fellow, Harvard Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University (2014–15).  The
author clerked for Judge Noonan from 1987 to 1988.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, & WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (5th ed. 2002).
2. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
3. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35–51, 142.
(667)
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This shorthand phrase allows an adjective embodying the mask of illegality
to become a noun describing the person, conveying the fact that our soci-
ety deems other aspects of personhood in this context to be irrelevant.  A
different and more specific noun is ordinarily used to describe an object
illegally imported into the jurisdiction or illegally manufactured in the ju-
risdiction, such as an illegal drug or an illegal rendition of a copyrighted
movie, but an illegal person can simply be referred to as an “illegal.”
This “illegal” label—whether used as an adjective or noun—some-
times attaches to entire families of people but sometimes attaches only to
fathers and/or mothers, but not to their children, or vice versa.  Relation-
ships between parents and their children and other familial ties are impor-
tant for determining legal status only if the law says so, for example, if one
or both of a child’s parents are citizens.  If not, and if the law designates
some family members as legal and others as illegal, separation may be
required.4
What impact does using the word “illegal” to describe a person have
on a person’s legal rights?  Does our practice of deeming people “illegal”
because they are illegally present in the jurisdiction invite courts to deny
to these persons fundamental rights, including the right to due process?
While the Constitution does not define due process differently for
persons legally and illegally present in the United States, our courts in
practice do treat “illegals” differently.  Consider the following account of
the procedures used by federal magistrates in “Operation Streamline,”
which began in 2005 as part of a “zero tolerance” policy toward illegal
immigration:
Most of the new deportees passing by describe having been
shackled hand and foot for the Streamline court in Tucson.
Many have just spent 30 days or more at a facility in Florence,
one run by Corrections Corporation of America, a private prison
behemoth that jails Streamline convicts for the U.S.
government. . . .
Migrants—who once would have been removed from the country
through a civil-administrative process and barred from legal re-
entry—now return home with a criminal record that could ex-
pose them to escalating punishment if they cross the border
again to escape poverty, find work, and/or reunite with loved
ones.
Streamline began as a “zero tolerance” approach to border en-
forcement during President George W. Bush’s administration.
Before its advent in 2005, aliens apprehended by the Border Pa-
4. Laws that compel splitting up families because of a person’s legal status are
not new to our legal system; before the Emancipation Proclamation, slaves were
also subjected to this experience because some were deemed to be the property of
one person and some the property of another person.
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trol generally were not prosecuted under existing criminal
statutes. . . .
[The magistrate judge] dispenses with the men and women in his
court in seven-person bursts.  The defendants before him are
dressed in the dirty, sweaty clothes they were captured in, their
hands shackled to their waists, their ankles in fetters.
They look weary and morose.  They have not had baths or show-
ers after several days in the desert, and the funk from this forced
lack of hygiene pervades the courtroom.  Indeed, the wall nearest
to where the remainder of the defendants are still seated is black-
ened with the dirt from countless bodies.
Beside each defendant in front of [the magistrate] is a lawyer,
often a private attorney hired by the court for $125 an hour
under the provisions of the U.S. Criminal Justice Act, which guar-
antees counsel to the indigent.  Some are represented by salaried
federal public defenders.  Each lawyer has four to six clients in a
day’s Streamline lineup.
[The magistrate] runs through a series of questions relayed to
each migrant with the rapidity of an auctioneer, mumbling as he
goes, head down.
Individually, he asks them compound questions, translated into
Spanish by an interpreter and transmitted to them via head-
phones: Do you understand your rights and waive them to plead
guilty?  Are you a citizen of Mexico (or Guatemala or El Salva-
dor), and on such-and-such a date near such-and such a town,
did you enter the United States illegally?
The answers never vary: “Sı´.”
Then he asks them, as a group, whether anyone has coerced
them into a plea of guilty.  “No,” the chorus replies.
Again, they’re asked, as a group, whether they are pleading guilty
voluntarily because they are in fact guilty.  The chorus cries, “Sı´.”
First-timers receive time served for the petty offense of illegal
entry.
Those charged with illegal reentry, a felony, plead guilty to the
lesser offense of illegal entry and get anywhere from 30 to 180
days. . . .
However, in December 2009, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found in U.S. vs. Roblero-Solis that Streamline hearings vio-
lated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
[requiring] that judges “must address the defendant personally
3
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in open court” and determine whether the defendant’s guilty
plea and waiver of rights is voluntary. . . .
The Ninth Circuit did not tackle constitutional issues, leaving it
up to magistrates as to how they should proceed.  Nevertheless,
the Ninth Circuit made clear that it frowned upon magistrates
taking pleas en masse, which was occurring prior to Roblero-Solis.5
The opinion referenced in this news article, United States v. Roblero-Solis,6
was written by Judge Noonan.  Marginal improvements have resulted in
the due process rights of accused illegal immigrants, but these cases con-
tinue to be dispensed with very quickly and with minimal due process.
John Noonan has addressed this problem in both his scholarship7
and in written opinions on the Ninth Circuit.8  Noonan acknowledges that
the law sometimes requires that a person who is here illegally be deported,
usually to return to the country from which he or she came.  However,
Noonan also recognizes that when a judge makes such a decision about a
person, that person is entitled to the same due process rights as other
persons who are parties to civil or criminal cases in our courts.9
By embracing political principles that deem a person to be “illegal”
because that person is illegally present in the country, our society perhaps
invites such due process abuses.  We fail to recognize that these cases in-
volve parties who are persons—a fact that does not change because these
persons are accused of doing something illegal, usually the act of entering
the country without permission and sometimes other illegal acts as well.
Ironically, we got to this point incrementally; the law has not always
been this way.  Many of our ancestors came to America without permission
from the people who were already here.  The Mayflower passengers in
1620 were among the earliest of these immigrants, but there were tens of
thousands more.  The Mayflower passengers left their home country ille-
gally (they did not get permission to emigrate from England), and went to
another country (Holland), where they obtained a ship and sailed to
America.  They did not know if they would be welcome.  They did not ask
permission to come.  They simply came.
The Americans who were already here could have killed the
Mayflower passengers, or they could have detained them and sent them
5. Stephen Lemons, Grinding Justice: Operation Streamline Costs Millions, Tram-
ples the Constitution, Treats Migrants like Cattle, and Doesn’t Work, PHOENIX NEWTIMES
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2010-10-21/news/grinding-
justice-operation-streamline-costs-millions-tramples-the-constitution-treats-mig
rants-like-cattle-and-doesn-t-work/, cited in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W.
PAINTER, PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 658–60 (3d
ed. 2011).
6. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
7. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905
(2006).
8. See, e.g., Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692.
9. See generally id.
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back to England.  Or, they could have welcomed them to America and
taught them how to support themselves here.  These Americans—some-
times referred to as “Indians” or “Native Americans”—apparently chose
the latter course of action, a choice we are reminded of each year when we
celebrate Thanksgiving.10  Descendants of the Mayflower passengers now
number in the hundreds of thousands, and some have joined a society that
honors the memory of these pilgrims and the Native Americans who
helped them.11
Many subsequent waves of immigrants came to America, and some
did not fare so well with Americans who were already here.  Altercations
sometimes broke out, with violence on both sides.  King Philip’s War was
one of the most noted early conflicts in Massachusetts.12  The immigration
story in America is a complex one.  Fear, prejudice, and violence some-
times predominate, while at other times, new immigrants make a genuine
effort to integrate themselves into the existing order of society, and that
society makes a genuine effort to accept the immigrants.  For more than a
century, however, all of this took place in the absence of federal laws im-
posing meaningful restrictions on who did and did not have a legal right
to be here.
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States em-
barked on a concerted effort to regulate and limit the flow of new immi-
grants to its shores.13  Although our population is not as dense as those of
other major world powers, including China, India, and the European
Union, these laws presumably assume that we can accommodate only a
10. The comedian and entertainer Will Rogers, himself of Cherokee descent,
once jokingly suggested that the Native Americans in this instance should have
taken a harsher stance against immigration:
ROGERS: Well, I think I am, folks Indian.  Both mother and father had
Cherokee in their blood in them born and raised in the Indian Territory.
Course I’m not one of these Americans whose ancestors come over on
the Mayflower, but eh, we met them at the boat when they landed.  It’s
always been to the everlasting discredit of the Indian race that we ever let
them land.  What, it’s the only thing I blame the Indians for, the biggest
bonehead they ever pulled . . . .
CAL. STATE PARKS, Video Transcript, Will Rogers: American, http://www.parks.ca.gov/
pages/735/files/willrogersorientation.pdf (last visited July 31, 2014) (alteration in
original).
11. See MASS. SOC’Y OF MAYFLOWER DESCENDANTS, Scholarships from the Society,
http://www.massmayflower.org/membership/benefits/scholarships/scholarships
.htm (last visited July 31, 2014) (announcing scholarship applications for Wampa-
noag Nation descendants in honor of that tribes’ assistance to Mayflower passen-
gers and requiring “proof of membership in the Wampanoag Nation by a tribal
official’s certification that the applicant is a bona fide member of a Tribe of the
Wampanoag Nation” for scholarship eligibility purposes).
12. See generally JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY (2009).
13. See The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2–9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); The Immigration Act
of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–1574
(2012)); The Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed
1943); The Page Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1943).
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limited number of new immigrants and that we need to enforce these lim-
its.  We have to varying degrees and in various ways enforced these laws, at
one point sending boatloads of Jewish refugees back to Nazi Germany to
face extermination because America did not choose to make room for
them.14  Immigrants who were allowed to come from, among other places,
Ireland, Italy, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan, often faced prejudice
upon arrival and occasionally violence from those who were already settled
here.  The law sometimes offered relief, but at other times stood idle or
was prejudiced against immigrants, even if that prejudice resulted in the
taking of human life15 or the internment of people without trial, includ-
ing U.S. Citizens, simply because of their ancestry.16
Like the Pilgrims who came before them, millions of people still
come to the United States, some without permission.  However, many new
Americans today are deemed to be here illegally because their act of enter-
ing the country without permission violated a specific provision of the
United States Code.  They are “illegal” persons.
Judges should recognize that these immigrants are persons rather
than nonentities hidden behind the mask of illegality and should allow
these immigrants the same due process rights as other persons in their
courts.  There is, however, little else that judicial officers can do to address
the situation.  A broken immigration system created by federal statutes in-
vites both unauthorized immigration to the United States and mass
processing of cases against persons accused of coming here illegally.  Presi-
dents Bush and Obama have urged Congress to fix our immigration sys-
tem,17 but Congress has so far done nothing.  Giving people hope—
substantial and meaningful hope—of being permitted to come to the
United States legally and to work here legally is a necessary part of any
reform that would reduce the number of people who enter the country
illegally.  Reduced illegal immigration would lighten our courts’ immigra-
tion caseloads and perhaps allow meaningful attention to the concerns
14. See SARAH A. OGILVIE & SCOTT MILLER, REFUGE DENIED: THE ST. LOUIS
PASSENGERS AND THE HOLOCAUST 105–06 (2010).
15. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369 (1926); see also NOONAN &
PAINTER, supra note 5, at 619–49 (discussing trial transcript).
“I met Judge Thayer once.  This too was some years after the trial.  We
were in his chambers in Boston settling an automobile accident case . . . .
I realized that Judge Thayer was no longer talking about our case, but
strutting up and down and boasting that he had been fortunate enough
to be on the bench when those sons of bitches had been convicted.”
Id. at 564 (quoting Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3
(1951)) (excerpting Charles Curtis’s account of his later meeting with Judge that
presided over Sacco trial).
16. See Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944)
(holding that internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II was
constitutionally valid).
17. President Bush and President Obama have proposed numerous bills dur-
ing their administrations.
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Judge Noonan and others have raised about fundamental due process
rights.
Our present immigration system is a grave threat to the rule of law in
our country, not because people emigrate without permission, as many
have done before them, but because the immigration system has become
so chaotic that our judicial officers cannot enforce the law without violat-
ing constitutional rights.  Our present immigration system is also a threat
to our national identity, which embraces—with conviction, even if sporadi-
cally in practice—substantive and procedural rights of persons in their re-
lationship with the state, individual rights often described by the word
“freedom”.  We also embrace the concept of America being a nation of
many cultures, and the custom of welcoming immigrants goes back to the
days of the Mayflower.  These are the reasons so many people want to live
here.  Making our immigration system conform to the traditional values of
our Country is a critically important task and a task that ultimately can
only be accomplished by the President and Congress.
III. WHEN COURTS SAY PERSONS ARE NOT ALIVE
Judges sometimes must decide if a live person exists in a particular
case.  In the temporal realm as we know it, human life has a beginning and
an end, or at least the law assumes as much (there is no secular legal rec-
ognition of the concept of “eternal life”).  Courts struggle, however, to
discern the beginning of human life as well as to discern the end of
human life.  To make these distinctions, courts sometimes look to abstract
principles and legal rules that higher courts previously articulated for de-
fining the span of human life.  Alternatively, as Judge Noonan’s scholar-
ship suggests would be preferable, at least when possible, courts could
make findings of fact about whether there is a live human being in each
particular case in which a party alleges that the case concerns the interests
of a live human being.
One risk of allowing abstract legal principles to define human life is
that courts can apply the prevailing principles of the day and decide that a
being is not fully “human” or is not fully “alive,” even if faced with over-
whelming evidence of a live human being.  Legal principles are thus al-
lowed to constrict that person’s existence in the eyes of the law.  The
person is deemed not to be a person or only partially a person, having
some legal rights, but not others, presumably because some abstract prin-
ciple requires it.  Judge Noonan wrote about just such a legal regime in his
account of colonial Virginia’s laws with respect to slaves.18  The abstract
principles applied in these instances may be designed to protect another
person’s actual or perceived legal rights (in Judge Noonan’s example, the
rights of the slave holder) and/or to prevent the political crisis that could
result if the other person’s “rights” are threatened.  These abstract legal
principles, however, have little to do with the facts.
18. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35–51, 142.
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The Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford19 thus weighed the legal
rights of slaves against the claimed property rights of slave owners.  Be-
cause the Court did not recognize slaves to fully be persons under the law,
it found in the slave holders’ favor.  This result was overturned by a bloody
Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, but the
decision was grounded in the Court allowing abstract legal principles, in-
cluding principles embodied in the Constitution at the time, to be the
basis for factual assumptions about human beings.  The Court knew there
was no such thing as “three-fifths” a person in the real world, but it none-
theless followed an abstract legal principle that a slave was barely half a
person.
Nearly 120 years later, the Court in Roe v. Wade20 faced a situation that
was much more difficult to decide: whether or not a human life worthy of
protection under the law is taken away by an abortion.  Specifically, the
legal question in Roe was whether or not there existed a compelling state
interest in prohibiting abortion that overrides the privacy rights of the
mother.  This legal question turns in large part on a factual question of
whether the aborted fetus is a live human being.  The Court discussed this
question at length, relying on abstract legal principles—some dating back
to Greek and Roman law—and also on then-modern medical facts related
to fetal development during the first six months of gestation.21  In con-
cluding, the Court articulated a legal principle that defined the beginning
of human life, or at least human life worthy of protection by the law, draw-
ing the line at three months.
“End of life” situations are another category of cases in which a court
may decide whether an alive person exists or whether a person is deceased
in-fact (these definition-of-death cases are different from the “right to die”
cases in which it is acknowledged that a person is alive and steps are taken
to end that life at that person’s direction or the direction of another).  In
definition-of-death cases,22 courts decide when a person who once existed
no longer exists, either because they have disappeared or because their
bodily and mental functions have eroded to a point where a person is
deemed to be dead.  Once again, abstract legal principles could determine
the outcome of these cases regardless of the actual facts—saying that a
person is “legally dead” or “legally alive” regardless of whether the person
19. 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. See id. at 160–61 (“The Aristotelian theory of ‘mediate animation,’ . . .
continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite
opposition to this ‘ensoulment’ theory from those in the Church who would recog-
nize the existence of life from the moment of conception.”); see also id. at 160, 160
nn. 59–60 (discussing medical evidence on viability of fetus).
22. See, e.g., Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 533
(1988) (defining death related to young man’s suicide attempt and doctor’s subse-
quent diagnosis of “brain dead”); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (discussing
evolving definition of death regarding “brain dead” child and medical technology
advancement).
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is in fact dead.23  Alternatively, the decision could be less grounded in
abstract principles and based instead upon the facts in each case.
This distinction between abstract principles based jurisprudence and
facts based jurisprudence makes a big difference in both abortion and end
of life cases.  Abstract legal principles defining the human life span may
originate from human perceptions of factual evidence of there being life
or no life in a particular instance, but after one court articulates a legal
principle, others may follow it.  The Roe Court even cited Roman law, al-
though it did not follow it.  Stare decisis requires courts to follow the legal
principles of higher courts in their jurisdictions.  By contrast, factual con-
clusions depend upon facts in a particular case and are not binding prece-
dent.  Indeed, what some other court decided about factual evidence—
even similar factual evidence—in some other case, is usually only margin-
ally relevant or not relevant at all in a new case involving new facts.
In situations where advances in science inform human perception of
factual evidence, human perception of even very similar facts is likely to
change as science changes over time.  To the extent courts decide cases
defining the beginning and end of the human life span based upon scien-
tific analysis of evidence, courts’ conclusions about the existence of
human life in very similar factual scenarios could change.
But changes to factual assumptions and the legal rules that follow
from those assumptions can have a political cost.24  Particularly, if some
people could have their legal rights curtailed, all three branches of gov-
ernment could be threatened with political turmoil when a court attempts
to make what it believes to be an accurate finding of fact that diverges
from what other courts have done before.  Courts may choose instead not
to change their decisions about a controversial fact, even if scientific evi-
dence has changed and even if the question of fact is as important as the
existence or nonexistence of a human life.  A court can avoid the uncer-
tainties of scientific analysis and instead use abstract legal principles to
resolve the factual question.  In countries where the Catholic Church still
has great influence, the abstract principle defining the beginning of
human life might be based upon the factual conclusion that human life
begins at conception because the Church says so.  In more secular coun-
23. These cases turn, to varying degrees, on the factual circumstances that put
certain legal principles into play, but the legal principles sometimes control the
analysis at a very early stage, leading to absurd conclusions. See, e.g., John Schwartz,
Declared Legally Dead, as He Sat Before the Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/declared-legally-dead-as-he-sat-before-the-
judge.html?_r=0 (reporting case of Donald Miller, Jr., Ohio man who went missing
for several years, was declared dead, and then later re-emerged, appearing at court
where Hancock County Court still declared Mr. Miller to be dead for Social Secur-
ity purposes).  This man was still legally dead even if he could stand before the
Court and make it obvious to everyone present that he was in fact alive! See Joseph
Vining, Reading John Noonan, 59 VILL. L. REV. 715, 722–23 (2014).
24. This cost may be substantial, even if it is not as dramatic as a civil war that
the Supreme Court apparently tried to avoid with its abstract—and morally offen-
sive—definition of personhood in Dred Scott.
9
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tries such as the United States, the operative principle might be that
human life—or at least viable human life—begins three months after con-
ception because the United States Supreme Court said so in 1973 and has
not announced that it has changed its mind.
Legal precedent is thus allowed to do something that precedent nor-
mally does not do, which is to control determinations of fact in subsequent
cases for years or perhaps decades.  This continues until the precedent is
revisited by a court that is sufficiently influential, informed, and coura-
geous to do so when and if the scientific evidence suggests that the court
should make a determination of fact anew.  Until then, lower courts that
feel compelled to follow precedent on questions of fact simply fall into
line and follow the precedent, refusing to consider evidence that might
contradict it.  Precedent does not account for subsequent advances in
medicine and other sciences unless it is affirmed by a court that has actu-
ally considered those factors.  Precedent is still precedent, nonetheless.
To what extent is the weight of opinion in the medical community in
1973, about when a human fetus becomes a human being, if there was any
consensus in 1973, relevant for deciding that same question of fact in a
case forty-one years later in 2014?  The answer to this question is that the
view of the medical community in 1973, which influenced the opinion in
Roe v. Wade (it was authored by Justice Blackmun, who was the former
General Counsel of the Mayo Clinic) is very relevant—and indeed far
more relevant than what the medical community believes in 2014—
whether or not those views have changed.25  The earlier opinion is incor-
porated into a legal rule26 that is widely believed to be binding precedent
in 2014 cases.  If, however, the legal rule in Roe is really only a factual
conclusion now forty-one years old about the beginning of human life,
one wonders what a judge should do with that opinion in 2014.
Judge Noonan wrote a lot on this question, mostly in the decade after
Roe was decided27 and before he joined the Court of Appeals.  This author
is not certain he agrees with what Judge Noonan said on that question
(defining the beginning of a human life is then as now a conceptually and
factually difficult task).  This author, however, has serious concerns about
assigning too much weight now to anyone’s conclusions about that ques-
25. This author does not express an opinion here as to whether those views in
the medical community have in fact changed or whether they are likely to change
in the future other than to point out the obvious: perceptions of empirical evi-
dence are different now than they were in 1973 and will likely be yet more differ-
ent in the future.  Consensus about ultimate conclusions may or may not be the
same.
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116–17 (“[W]e have inquired into, and in this opinion
place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that his-
tory reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the
centuries.”).
27. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE
MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1–60 (John T. Noo-
nan, Jr. ed., 1970).
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tion in the 1970s and 1980s.  Facts are facts, and when human observation
of facts is shaped by quickly evolving medicine and science, courts and
commentators are obligated to reexamine those facts continuously to en-
sure to the best of their ability that these observations are correct.  This is
particularly true when facts concern the existence or nonexistence of a
human life.  No court—not even the Supreme Court—should consider
itself too busy to undertake that inquiry as often as needed to make the
best possible effort to get the facts right.
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